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DISCUSSION
DOES ANTITRUST REGULATION VIOLATE THE RULE OF
LAW?
By Elbert L. Robertson
PROFESSOR ROBERTSON: Does antitrust regulation
violate the rule of law? I think the rule of law part of this we've
got down pat pretty well across a wide range of papers today
with Maurice having starting us off. We understand what the
basic idea of the rule of law is, and that we are under a legitimate
system of law if it is one that is generally binding,
authoritative, transparent, fair, knowable, informative, one
that offers opportunities for due process, etcetera. The general
concept is that in a legal system under the rule of law, the law is
equally binding on us all and we're tied together by that system.
However, the next part of this title that is probably a little
tricky and perhaps maybe a little eccentric as it relates to this
antitrust regulation stuff. You might ask: What in the world do
you mean by antitrust regulation? Most of us here are antitrust
lawyers or competition lawyers and we understand that antitrust
basically is one thing and regulation is something else. Antitrust
following from the Sherman Act is sort of the legal rules of
the game for the process of economic competition, even though
as we all know the word competition is not even in Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, at least literally the word is not there. It was
read in.
We know that antitrust law and process are the rules of
the game. However, economic regulation is thought and taught to
be largely something else. Standard textbook definitions would
say it is a process of assigning prices and quantities for economic
goods, done oftentimes by government bureaucrats, because
markets have failed to achieve desired allocative outcomes. So in
contrast, antitrust law sort of sits on the proposition that there are
markets that are functioning to some degree but just need to be
cleaned up some way or other. While regulation sits on the idea
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that markets have essentially failed, and therefore intervention is
warranted to try to get the next best possible results in terms of
prices and outputs of goods that would be produced and this is
the proper goal of the regulatory scheme. So when I talk about
antitrust regulation, I'm not talking about two concepts that are
necessarily exclusive. Are they? And my answer is, if you read
down a little bit in the piece, absolutely not.
I think that antitrust wherever it is really effective and
meaningful it is regulation. In fact it is the most effective form of
regulation. And this separation which I refer to, is both artificial
and ahistorical. This reminds me of that hilarious film
noir moment in Casablanca where the police chief commandant
is escorted into the casino and exclaims suddenly, "Gambling in
Casablanca? Well, I'm shocked! This is shocking!" He says while
a few of his gambling chips are in his pocket with his cronies in
abundance. Totally shocked! Antitrust regulation.
We shouldn't be shocked by this at all. The fact is a lot of
antitrust process, activity and law by necessity involves effective
regulation. And it's a different type of regulation in most cases
than standard traditional rate-structure regulation because when
antitrust law regulates and decides, it often is deciding between a
plaintiff and defendant. So it is also therefore deciding about a
winner and a loser.
Another very important part of what the antitrust impulse
is increasingly ignored and undermined in the modern world of
Chicago School doctrinal dominance. It is the extent to which
competitors and would-be competitors (and derivatively
consumers) are injured, harmed, damaged, and sometimes even
ruined by illegal, unfair anticompetitive devices and not
effectively compensated. Under rule of reason processes facing a
ninety percent plaintiffs' defeat rate. Plaintiffs prospects of either
corrective or compensatory justice, I think have been
skewered, largely out of the picture by contemporary
economic formalism, and I think one of the classic paradigmatic
examples of this is the demise of the per se rule which brings us
back full circle to Maurice's paper at the beginning of the day
which cites so eloquently, all of the problems, the problematic of
the rule of reason.
And as I said, I agree strongly that those structural and
functional infirmities exist, but what exacerbates the problem
even more are not just to the structural and logical infirmities
of the rule of reason. It's the fact that per se bright line rules
which reflect presumptions of illegality premised on factual
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predicates and precedent have been increasingly, and are
increasingly being run out of town on the rail. Under Chicago
school influence per se condemnation for Section 1 complaints
involving vertical restraints under the per se standard have
disappeared. (See Leegin.) Per se rules should never have existed
in the realm of Section 2, but we know some of the same issue
about the dominance of false negative space over false positive
space is an issue in Section 2 context as well. When you think
of Justice Scalia's rhetoric in his Trinko dicta, it serves as fair
warning about how far the extremes of that way of thinking can
go.
That being said as a broad introduction of the theme, the.
enterprise in this, the core part of the enterprise in this paper is
sort of picked up by a challenge that was suggested in a paper by
Tom Arthur in a 2000 super volume of articles in the Antitrust
Law Journal in response to Cal Dentist. In fact, Mark Patterson
who's here today published his famous "market power" piece in
that volume, it included a series of really great articles that in
light of quick-look rule of reasons demise in the Cal Dentists
ruling.
Tom Arthur wrote a very powerfully provocative Chicago
School oriented article in which he essentially throws down the
gauntlet and says... This is what we should do! Let's just get all
of these horizontal restraint Section 1 cases out of the federal
courts. The rule of reason is a mess. It's a morass; settling these
cases is impossible without running into all of the problems that
Maurice has suggested. Why don't we give this to the FTC to
resolve? They are going to do a better job in the federal court
because first of all federal courts involve lawyers, and judges who
are generalists. I'm just wondering, just give the stuff to the FTC.
We are here; we have the economic expertise and superior
competence to settle these types of issues.
And I make the historical point that of course the FTC did
after Justice
in fact come into being largely because
White announced the rule of reason and Standard Oil, there was
such an outcry that Woodrow Wilson was able to get the FTC
established because just the thought of having the American
economy sort of subject to the blowing winds of the rule of reason
was enough almost to send people back out into the streets rioting
like they were ready to do in 1890 when the Sherman Act was
initially passed. So Arthur threw down the gauntlet. Now I pick
it up.
The other part of what I would like to talk about a little
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bit is whether or not administrative agency expertise in economic
matters, and I say this once again remembering that the FTC and
Commissioner Calvani gave me my first job in Washington some
twenty-five years ago, and I like to think that the fine group of
economists I worked with back in those days might very well be
capable of doing something that the federal courts can't do,
which is to find efficient effective antitrust results that will
promote the broader goals of the American economy in a more
effective way than the federal courts under the rule of reason
currently are able to do.
I like to think or at least ponder whether or not that is
true. I pondered it for a moment and I have decided that it's
false. And it's false for a couple of important reasons. First of all,
serious formal structural infirmities exist within administrative
law decision-making processes as well, which do not categorically
privilege agencies over courts. That being said, if we get
around the legal process question of whether or not
the delegation/non-delegation
doctrine ultimately gives that
responsibility to the FTC more so than it would give it to the
federal courts since the federal courts still would have ideally the
last say on these legal questions the way our system works.
Putting that aside for a moment and we'll come back to
that, I don't think that it necessarily is going to work very well
because the Commission and pretty much any other regulatory
body that does conventional .law economic decision-making
already follows a cost-benefit variant of the rule of reason. As I
said earlier to Maurice, ultimately the rule of reason is all we
have. We can even characterize the per se rule as the per se rule of
reason. It's just more sharply attenuated based on factual
presumption. And in following the rule of reason it falls into all
the pitfalls and that you pointed out so well in your paper.
Now, I've spread around a copy of the DOJ/FTC
guidelines, and I took this out of Einer Elhauge's text. If you just
look at it, it doesn't take very long at all. Just eyeball it. Would
you look at the purpose definitions scope, the terms
for collaboration, and these are our guidelines. These are our
horizontal guidelines. They boil down to one thing. They all boil
down to the principles of a very seminal old antitrust case,
Addyston Pipe and Steel.' Because the sum total of
these conditions essentially is that horizontal restraints that are
merely ancillary to the main purpose of a legitimate contract are

Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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going to be evaluated on the rule of reason, and if they generate
sufficient enough efficiencies, they are going to be allowed. That's
the Commission's position. That is the Department of Justice's
position. That's the rule of reason.
But that is also the rule of reason with all the problems,
Maurice, that you pointed out that the rule of reason has, and
that doesn't necessarily get us all that far for the same reason that
the rule of reason as you pointed out doesn't get us all that
far. Not only is that a problem, the other part is that the FTC and
the other administrative bodies even if their adjudicatory
capacities don't have private enforcement or state enforcement
powers that would settle what I think is the other important part
of the question which is whether or not private clients injured by
these devices are going to be able to correctively compensated.
The answer is they don't do it. So we'll be back to the court again
anyway if the antitrust law was going to provide that
compensation, and the antitrust laws I don't think can be just or
effectively under the rule of law unless they can provide.
Last point and this is looking back from the perspective of
the Leegin case which I think is the last big major decision of the
Supreme Court on issues of horizontal restraints, per se rule of
reason, in which the sort of last vestige in the vertical restraint
context of regarding minimum resale price maintenance was
wiped out, as a per se criteria, and is now going to be judged
like everything else, under the rule of reason. Universal space of
per se shrinking, shrinking, shrinking. And why? Because the
argument is that the universal space of protection from
false positives has to grow, grow, grow. Very much consistent
with Chicago ideology.
So we have Justice Kennedy who says, look, wide
evidence out there, the retail price maintenance can be a good
thing, and while there may be some evidence out there that in
some cases it may be a bad thing, the per se rule should only be
applied when something is so inherently bad that it's almost
always a bad thing otherwise we might generate false positives,
and lord knows we never want to do that. But if some false
negative through, we'll work it out. But false positives, no, that
we can't do.
The administrative challenge from the perspective of
doctrine like Leegin doctrine, puts a very interesting I think spin
on this problem in terms of the interpretive statutory
interpretive dimensions of the force of the rule of reason. This is
what I mean. The rule of reason now is the predominate

Discussion - Robertson

2009

paradigm. It's almost the only paradigm.
And that means when we interpret the Sherman Act we
read the Sherman Act, we got a huge varying of the rule of reason
to figure out how we're going to crank out the results and
whether or not Section 1 has been violated. And we see like under
these guidelines we get enough efficiency, no violations. That
means, for example, a case like Topco2 horizontal divisions,
enough efficiency, no per se. None. I mean broad categories of
law that under stare decisis, precedent wouldn't have
allowed these behaviors for per se reasons are now going to be
reshaped. Well, as stare decisis is increasingly disregarded, isn't
the rule of law increasingly impaired? Predictability? Reliability?
Fairness? We don't have to worry about that, but the rest of us
do.
Antitrust lawyers and competition lawyers and in Europe
hopefully you will continue to be concerned about that and if you
are, you be careful about the extent of which you employ the rule
of reason. That's it.
MR. McGRATH: There are two specific points in Elbert's
paper that I thought were interesting to me as a European
lawyer. One was I was less shocked about the idea that antitrust
may invoke regulation and without going into too much detail
given the time I'll just give an example of a particular regime. in
the UK where we don't just have a prohibition on
anticompetitive-but we also have a market investigation regime
which involves looking at an entire sector and if there is
a problem with that sector, then rules can be introduced to
change how that sector operates. And it's a long running practice
in a monopoly regime, in its later incarnation from 2003 but goes
back much further than that.
And it is a very administrative system. It's a system based
on very in-depth financial analysis of a sector, profit margins, and
other measures, financial measures of a sector, and according to
what was previously viewed as public interest now is in principle
competition test but it is a very, very broad competition test.
And it is a very uncertain regime. I think they didn't
necessarily expect after a few years they would be required to sell
some of the crown jewels of the estate but that is how the regime
operates in the UK and that's part of in a very raw term could be
classed as antitrust law. And I also remember from my time at
the OFK that it was commonplace to talk about competition
2

United States v. Topco Ass'n, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
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policy not competition law. It was a matter of law and they were
uncomfortable with the idea that they were a competition
enforcement law enforcement agency.
Also moving on to the false positive point. I do still think
that it's not a bad thing to be weary of false positives, and I think
an authority should be .very humble and very reluctant to
interfere with what commercial entities have autonomously
decided. I see it in a form of Hippocratic oath, do no harm. Do
not go in there and mess about with things you do not
understand. An example I would give is the French authorities
recently banned the exclusivity agreement between France
Telecom and Apple about exclusive marketing of the iPhone in
France. Now I don't know the case in detail, but I don't see
quite what the problem is. Apple does not have market power in
mobile phones. France Telecom might have a bit of market
power but not sufficient to make that a real problem. They just
went in and banned it, and I think this would have a chilling
huge effect on pro-competition, pro-consumer investment.
My final point, I'll abuse my privilege slightly to sum this
up, I think there is an important distinction between the different
areas of rule of law. There is a distinction between what the law
is and how the law is applied. And I think to seek perfect
consistency and predictability on what the law is a chimera and
that reaction comes through in Elbert's presentation. And I also
think it's nice to have but if you don't get the administration of
the law right, if you don't get the procedure right, then you are
lost. That is a must. So I think I'm probably being very
European on that point and really pressing on procedure but
I think you have to get that right.
PROFESSOR DOGAN: I have a variety of thoughts that
relate not only to this conversation, but also to many different
comments that have been made throughout the day. Different
people have talked about whether antitrust law or competition
law is working well. At the moment, for example, we'ie
discussing whether regulatory antitrust works well or not, and
under what circumstances. And these kind of comments - about
how well antitrust law is performing or can perform - have
occurred throughout the day. I keep coming back to a question under what metric are we measuring antitrust's performance?
What is the measure for deciding whether the law is working well
or not? And I guess it states the obvious that the answer turns on
our predispositions about the normative goals of antitrust law.
It depends on whether we're more concerned about
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protecting the ability of businesses to dictate their own business
ventures without interference from the government or whether
we're more concerned about competitors who are harmed by
those businesses when they act in exclusionary ways. That itself is
a judgment that is influenced by .one's economic and political
viewpoint. And so I have been feeling all day like these
conversations end up being circular because our views of the
law's efficacy turns on our view of what antitrust law ought to be
doing.
One final point. Even if we can't fully agree on the
normative goals of antitrust laws, I think there's some
opportunity for empirical work on the costs and benefits of
alternative legal approaches. So, for example, I think there's a
baseline level of agreement that if a firm's behavior has a
demonstrable adverse welfare effect, and if we can identify the
behavior reliably without the risk of false positives, it ought to be
found a violation of the law.
It seems to me that in the merger context, and perhaps in
the retail price maintenance context, there could be some
empirical work, event studies, and other studies that look at the
effect of the behavior on prices in the market. That might be a
satisfying way of going about determining what kinds of
behavior, as a rough guess, ought to be presumptively viewed as
competitive or anticompetitive.
PROFESSOR STUCKE: First, one of the things that you
picked up on, and Leegin, the court now can say under our new
economic wisdom we're no longer bound by the policies
underlying the Sherman Act. You may disagree with what are
the policies. But the court can say we are determined by what we
perceive to be the new economic wisdom. And Justice Breyer said
how are we going to determine that? Are we going to count heads
of economists? And the people at the Supreme Court at that time
hearing oral arguments laughed.
Basically the court can say here is the new economic
wisdom and we feel the purpose of the antitrust law is to protect
interbrand competition at the expense of intrabrand competition.
Then that is going to be itself another element of subjectivity that
the court will then weigh. And do we really want the court, any
court, not only in the United States but also elsewhere
particularly when the Sherman Act is both criminal as well as a
civil status to govern the standards based on its perception of new
economic wisdom.,
Now with respect to your point about first do no harm,

Loyola Consumer Law Review

Vol. 22:1

that assumes that markets operate independently of the
government or the legal institutions, and that if markets left alone
will achieve allocated efficiency. Well, I think you have to
recognize that markets and government and legal institutions are
reinforcement, that the legal institutions provide the framework
in order to achieve allocated efficiency. It can effectively lower
transaction cost. And there are many instances, for example, in
consumer protection law where the law seeks to prevent market
failure and to foster transactions and the like. So I think it's more
nuance in terms of yes, you have to have a respect for false
positives but you also have to look at false negatives.
-PROFESSOR WALLER: I had two brief comments and
then I have Harry, Christian, and Elbert in the queue and
whoever wants to weigh in before we break.
My two comments are in part building on Maurice's
which is I think humility is important but I think it's a two-way
street. And I think we have strong evidence that largely
unregulated commercial arrangements contributed significantly
to the economic wreckage that we're trying to sort out here. So
humility and public and private decisions is clearly a good thing
and in too short supply. I think we are in a situation
of competition administrative law on both sides of the Atlantic. I
think we're there already and I think it's just a question of what
is good administrative law. And that is a lens that we haven't
gotten into exclusively but does really guide us to what agencies
should do and courts should do after agencies have done their
decision making process. In the U.S., it's very peculiar. We have
one administrative agency that was set up as an administrative
agency.
Obviously those of you who know me, I start from a
very different place than Tom Arthur does, but I get close to his
destination which is we really did set up the FTC to be the
principal administrative agency for really complex stuff
and obviously not the price-fixing stuff which is part of our
criminal law system. But that in my mind is the only law
enforcement aspect of antitrust that is really left in the U.S. And
the Justice Department has the sole statutory authority to
bring these cases. They do so under democracy-publicly, they do
so vigorously. And they do a reasonably good job at it.
One could make a good argument beyond price fixing is
you have two agencies, one of whom is an administrative agency
by design with procedures and various things and one is the rest
of the antitrust division which is acting like an administrative
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agency through guidelines, consent decrees, other kinds of things
but isn't constrained by our administrative procedures act and
also doesn't get the benefit of deferential court review. So we
have a very peculiar system. Maybe it all sorts out in the end in a
very pragmatic way that it works like administrative law, but
I'm still enough of a rule of law person that if you do it that way
somebody, i.e. Congress, should really say so.
But I do think the focus is what is good administrative law
because I think we've evolved in a variety of ways for perfectly
sensible reasons, just a lot of hydraulic pressures to have agencies
make these complex trade-offs subject to some kind of deferential
court review. But again you have to make sure the agency is
doing its job and the court is doing its job.
PROFESSOR FIRST: Three points from the discussion.
One of the things I hear about rule of law is predictability, stare
decisis, and then I think about the common law's ability to
change and overrule precedent. So I want to put in my plug right
now for non-stare decisis and not at this moment saying, guess
what, let's freeze the rule of law right now, because actually I
think some people, not everyone, would like to not be stuck with
the current rules of law, which in many ways people
think actually are deficient, and to be able to take account of
whether for better or worse we are stuck to some degree with
these economists, or to take account of other economics than
what the court has considered. So there is a bit of a trap in
the "we love the rule of law" because the rule of law right now is
not what I love. So that's the first thing.
. The second thing is to thank you Elbert for plugging
Topco. Peter Carstensen and I did a piece about it. There is a
series, for those of you who don't know, called Antitrust Stories.
This is a series of books that Foundation Press has put out
in various areas, property, tax, antitrust, and as we know we
have lots of great stories. So Peter and I did a story, not a story
because it's the truth about the Topco case. And for those of you
who don't recall, Topco involved an agreement among a group
of sort of mid-sized supermarket chains basically in an idea to
divide markets using the licensing of the Topco brand private
label to keep each other out of each other's market.
This is a famous per se case, avoiding a "ramble through
the wilds of economic theory." We can't do this, says Justice
Marshall, and the case is the poster child for why the Warren
Court is so God-awful. But Topco was really interesting in
one part because so far as you can tell from the facts it really was
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a cartel of potential competitors and they were trying to keep
each other out of their markets.
But I want to give you a sense of what a per se trial was in
1967. It consisted of no depositions taken by the government. No
expert witnesses for the government. The government didn't
even depose Topco's expert witnesses. The trial consisted of
a government lawyer presenting answers to interrogatories and
resting. That took four minutes. And then Topco itself took seven
trial days to present its defense. This was the trial. And very
efficiently, in the end the Supreme Court decided that this
was per se illegal. And Peter and I think that actually that was
the right decision substantively, although there was not really a
full record. You probably could do more to understand the facts.
The trick is how much more do you really need, but what
you probably don't need is a full rule of reason. There really
wasn't a good justification. Post-Topco history was Topco
then had to license its label. The members couldn't keep each
other out of each other's markets. They all entered. They
competed vigorously. They have new private labels now and
Topco is the second largest group of grocery store product sellers,
second after Wal-Mart. They have been fine. Great victory for
antitrust. So that's my Topco story. Be sure to buy the book. I
actually don't get royalties. My colleague Eleanor Fox who is the
editor probably gets the royalties. But there are lots of great
stories.
A third point. This is a concern for enforcement modesty,
and having spent a little time at the New York State Attorney
General's office, you get a little sense of what your concern is
about false positives in enforcement and doing no harm. But just
a little counter-story on the other side. This again is a 1960s story.
In 1966 a complaint was finalized, a 104-page complaint, against
General Motors, to break up General Motors. It was finalized,
leaked to the Wall Street Journal in 1967, but as we know, it
was never filed. So just take a moment. Think about
how different the world may have looked if the government had
filed that case-it couldn't have been modest to do that. To take
on General Motors and file that case. Suppose the government
had won. We wouldn't have had voluntary restraints on exports,
keeping
Japanese
cars
out. There
was
a cartel
to
restrain competition in smog technology. That might not
have happened, and if it had happened you wouldn't have had a
president who squelched further enforcement against the cartel,
as Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s. Very different history. So if
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we're worried about false positives, we also need to think about
false negatives.
MR. AHLBORN: Two brave comments and I have to
reverse the order. One was on the market investigation. Harry,
what you just said if you had market investigation you asked that
would have been exactly the way to go about it. If you look at
it from an antitrust perspective that I think is easy. You look at
you have an agreement, you have no agreement. Market
investigation is sort of industrial policy. I don't like this structure,
I'll break it up. I don't like the information flow, etcetera. So I
think for me I find it sort of not only do no harm; it's just roll up
the sleeves and play around it.
My other point is sort of type one, type two, I think there
are two of them. One on the export investigation, I happen to
think that agreement of behavior and investigated. The more
important one is what signal does that have in hope people
change their behavior, as a result of the case. And that to me is
more important sort of type one and type two area and puts a bar
on the complexity of what antitrust can do. Let's assume the
Commission got it wrong in Microsoft, or in some of the other
cases, almost irrelevant what signal it sends out. As to how people
change their behavior is really what matters and sort of on a very
limited information what business people have in order to come
to view on how they behave, and therefore I think sort of the
rules have to be relatively simple because otherwise if you make
it too complex, you send out the wrong signals.
PROFESSOR ROBERTSON: Two quick points. First
goes to Stacey's question about empirical evidence and this is
brought up both in Breyer's and Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion in Leegin. The facts are in. Minimum vertical resale
price maintenance basically results in higher prices. The ground
shifts. Discussions about what interbrand is versus intrabrand
and whether or not that additional gravy that ensued as a result
of the high prices is going to result in a better optimal mix in
terms of the goods provided to people, consumers, and the jury is
out on that. We don't know. But we know one thing, the per se
rule is gone as a standard. So much for empiricism.
Second point about what is good administrative law in
this context. And from a legal process perspective, I would have
to wonder assuming that the delegation is profit, to
the commission, what is it really going to mean in order to have
adjudicatory and rule-making processes predicated on ancillary
restraint structures when ancillary restraint structures are so
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easily deconstructed? When we teach Addyston Pipe and Steel
what is the first thing we ask the students? What is the main
purpose and isn't it circular to talk about a lawful contract before
we determine what the main purpose is? I mean that level
of deconstructability is still going to be an issue that is going to be
faced by the administrative law judges and experts in the agency.
How far is that advancing the ball in terms of the rule of
law concerns?
PROFESSOR WALLER: Elbert, you're right, but just for
what it's worth, it's the FTC that did the heavy lifting, the highly
automobile
case
from
Detroit
suspect classification
through tenors, and that's the formulation of the quick look that
has gotten the most respect and support from the courts. It didn't
come out of the DOJ.
MR. CALVANI: We have heard not one but two defenses
of Topco today. That is very unusual-perhaps bizarre.
PROFESSOR FIRST: We pile on.
MR. CALVANI: Undoubtedly a Woodstock retrospective
on competition law.
PROFESSOR FIRST: I want to thank you. That's one of
the nicer things I've heard said today.
MR. CALVANI: Sex, drugs and rock 'n roll, and now
Woodstock/New Age competition law. The dual or concurrent
jurisdiction of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission is a perennial topic.
Academicians in search for a research topic ought to note the very
nice natural experiment that has been taking place for a long
time.
Both agencies have current jurisdiction over Section 7 of
the Clayton Act and both of them handle mergers. It would be
very interesting to measure how the agencies have done. Perhaps
one could compare their output and come to some reasoned
judgment about which has done a better job. Serious work on
this topic would help inform the debate.
PROFESSOR DOGAN: How do you define better?
MR. CALVANI: Perhaps one could study post-transaction
output or price? Doubtless design of such a study would not be
easy, but the results could be very interesting.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Picking up on Commissioner
Calvani's last point. I believe that the FTC, at times in
conjunction with the DOJ, has undertaken in a more generalized
manner a portion of the type of historical analysis you advocate. I
am thinking in particular of the FTC's retrospective review of
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hospital mergers and the FTC/DOJ's workshop and data
dissemination focused on agency merger enforcement decisions
over the course of a half dozen years. I would hope these and
such other initiatives will increase in the future. Of course, even
with the benefit of hindsight there will be cases in which
reasonable minds will disagree about the lessons to be learned.
With regard to comparisons between the two agencies
within the merger arena, I also agree that further research would
be useful. One obvious, albeit more historical, point of reference
are the two merger guidelines (each agency produced it's own
policy statement) released on the same day in 1982. The two
documents diverged in some fascinating ways, which, I have
argued, are probably attributable in part to the agencies'
different institutional designs. Given their ongoing, overlapping
jurisdiction, the natural experiment continues. Switching topics
slightly here, I would argue that the FTC has not always
sufficiently exploited its natural strengths and comparative
advantages. Section 5 of the FTC's enabling legislation could
provide a logical outlet for doing so.
Briefly turning to Harry's comments, I would second his
defense of non-stare decisis. And, as Harry also discussed, the
relative appeal of stare decisis at any particular point will likely
reflect one's substantive estimation of the prevailing legal
holdings. Society clearly benefits when legal analysis evolves to
reflect increasing economic sophistication. Some have argued,
and I believe correctly at times, that changes in economic usage
have been ideologically driven. Overall, I believe antitrust has
been well-served by its grounding in broad-based legislation
coupled with common law evolution.
MR. COWEN: I was just going to comment about
something that Becket raised and that seems to me, I may be
wrong, things are taking place in the wrong place. If you are in an
administrative authority you should act as an administrator
carrying out policy defined by politicians, shouldn't you? I
remember writing a long brief to the British government in the
late 1990s, which asked what is competition policy? In principle I
suggested that before the government set out what the law is it
needed to set out what it was seeking to achieve and actually
have to have a policy. We couldn't find out what it was. In the
course of the proceedings in the House of Lords we decided it
would be quite fun to write down what we thought government
policy was supposed to be and let some Labour peers see it and
then take it up or not depending on whether they agreed. If you
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read Lord Cox's speech in the House of Lords on the Competition
act, I'm quite happy to say I wrote it because I did. He disclosed
his interest before he gave his speech.
And a couple a years ago I actually asked a researcher can
you go find me what UK government competition policy is?
What does the government actually think? This researcher came
back and gave me Lord Cox's speech in the House of Lords.
Which I was quite pleased with, but also very disappointed to
think that nothing had progressed. I think that's the starting
point problem. This is your question "What do we care about?"
Well that's. a policy matter. You can elect people to make
decisions, but I think it's wrong for other judges or officials to be
making that up as they go along. What worried me most about
Scalia's judgment in Trinko is that what he said is policy not law
and he appeared to be able to do that but he is a Judge not a
politician, at least he is a Judge because he sits in the Supreme
Court and if judges do the policy work of politicians I think that
breaches the separation of powers principles and that's all
completely wrong.
And the final thought which is something Phil and I
were talking about over dinner, why do it in Boston and why do
it before Patriot's Day. I was reading at the time Tom Payne and
Tom Payne was famous for many things. He wrote this brilliant
pamphlet called Common Sense, and in the pamphlet he said
there is a fundamental difference between merry old England and
the soon to be established United States of America. This was
that in England the king is the law whereas in America the law is
king. And that's a very neat exposition which I think we've sort
of missed in this area of antitrust, or there seems to me some
degree of encroachment on that principle, if you have
judges deciding what policy is what is the role for an
administrator or a politician? I think that's really made a mess of
things. It's a final thought.
PROFESSOR WALLER: I think this discussion today, if
it was a marathon time, it wouldn't be particularly impressive.
But we
covered a lot of ground from
a lot of
different perspectives, and I think that we did in fact pick the
right topic, and thank all of you for contributing your different
geographic, ideological, procedural, and substantive perspectives
to the discussion. You're all cordially invited to the next Antitrust
Marathon IV: Marathon with Authority. That would be the Irish
Competition Authority in Dublin in October.
DOCTOR MARSDEN: I want to thank you again,
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especially those who traveled so far. Thanks to the Consul
General for putting our British taxes to such good use and hosting
us. And yes, if you are able to make that very short hop across the
pond on October 27, 2009, in Dublin, and we're going to be
looking at issues that Terry raised: the role of the institutions
themselves, different institutional models, concurrency and other
policy interactions. A pleasure to see so many of you again and to
meet new friends.

